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IVO VAN BAEL*

The E.E.C. Antidumping RulesA Practical Approach
Now that the Council of the European Communities has adopted the first
three decisions' imposing antidumping duties, it may be appropriate to review
the European Economic Community (EEC) Antidumping Regulation to see
how it is being applied in practice.
Pursuant to Article 113, para. 1 of the Treaty of Rome providing for a common commercial policy, the Council of the European Communities issued
Regulation (EEC) N. 459/68 of April 5, 1968 "on protection against dumping
or the granting of bounties or subsidies by countries which are not members of

the European Economic Community." 2 This Regulation was amended on a
few procedural points in 19733 and 1977.4
The Regulation is in harmony with the rules laid down, as a result of the
"Kennedy Round," ' in Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) and in the Agreement on Implementation of that Article (in
particular, the so-called antidumping code). With repect to imports from
countries which are not members of GATT, the European Communities ex-

*De Bandt, van Hecke, van Gerven, Lagae & Van Bael, Brussels
'Cycle chains (Taiwan), Council Regulation (EEC No. 316/77 of February 14, 1977, O.J. No. L
45, February 17, 1977, p. 4). Rolling bearings (Japan), Council Regulation (EEC No. 1778/77 of
July 26, 1977, O.J. No. L 196, August 3, 1977, p. 1. Steel nuts (Taiwan) Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 2464/77 of November 7, 1977, O.J. No. L 286 of November 10, 1977, p. 7.
'0.J. No. L 93 of April 19, 1968; O.J, Spec. Ed. 1968 (1) p. 80.
'Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2011/73 of July 24, 1973 (O.J. No. L 206 of July 27, 1973,
p. 43).
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1411/77 of June 27, 1977 (O.J. No. L 160 of June 30, 1977,
p. 4).
'Apparently the GATT antidumping code came about as a result of the interest of the EEC and
the U.K. to clarify the administration of the withholding of appraisement measure as a provisional
remedy under the U.S. Antidumping Act, combined with the interest of the United States to influence the drafting of the EEC antidumping regulation mainly in the area of procedural
safeguard and to cause Canada to introduce an injury requirement in its antidumping law. See,
e.g., J. Rehm, The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 427-431 (1968).
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pressly reserved the right to go beyond the protective measures laid down in
the Regulation. 6
The Regulation applies to all products covered by the Treaty establishing the
EEC. As to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community, the Commission quite recently adopted antidumping
rules.' These new rules are similar to the Regulation under discussion, except
for some procedural points which reflect the different conceptions of the two

treaties, particularly regarding the form of cooperation between the Commission and the Member States.
With respect to agricultural products, the Regulation provides that it shall

operate "by way of complement" to the existing Community regulations
regarding agricultural products.' Since the latter also contain some protective
measures against imports causing serious disturbances, the Commission appears to enjoy some discretion whether in a given instance to proceed under the
rules covering the market organization of a given agricultural product or under
the antidumping regulation. 9
6Art. 1 1 2 of the Regulation. However, it appears that in practice the European Communities
comply with the Regulation also in proceedings against countries not members of GATT, as was
shown for instance in the Taiwan bicycle chains case, cited above.
'Commission Recommendation 77/329/ECSC on protection against dumping or the granting of
bounties or subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Coal and Steel Community, O.J. No. L 114, May 5, 1977, pp. 6-14. Presumably, this Recommendation is to be seen as
a reaction by the Commission against some recent national antidumping measures adopted by the
United Kingdom authorities (see, e.g., the Commission's answer to Written Question No. 227/77,
O.J. No. C 214, September 9, 1977, pp. 7-8).
Commission Recommendation No. 77/329/ECSC was amended on December 28, 1977 by
Commission Recommendation No. 3004/77/ECSC, O.J. No. L 352, December 31, 1977, pp.
13-14. The amendment, in addition to streamlining procedures regarding the monitoring of price
revisions promised by exporters and the refund of duties collected, introduces certain provisions
from the GATT antidumping code related to the simultaneous examination of dumping and injury, sporadic dumping (calling for a retroactive application of dumping duties) and the imposition of antidumping duties within a basic price system. With respect to the latter system, Article
8(d) of the GATT code provides that within a basic price system the antidumping duties shall be
"... equivalent to the amount by which the export price is less than the basic price established for
this purpose, not exceeding the lowest normal price in the supplying country or countries where
normal conditions of competition are prevailing.
... To cope with the crisis in the steel industry,
the Commission issued on December 31, 1977, basic prices for certain iron and steel products, effective from January 1, 1978, O.J. No. L 353, December 31, 1977, pp. 1-14. The introduction of a
basic price system has enabled the Commission at the beginning of 1978 to impose provisional antidumping duties on a number of iron and steel products without first publishing a notice in the
Official Journaland organizing a hearing as would otherwise have been required pursuant to Article 11(2) of Commission Recommendation No. 77/329/ECSC. In fact, the respective Notices of
the initiation of antidumping proceedings in several cases were published on the same day as the
publication of the impositions of provisional antidumping duties. It is to be pointed out, however,
that the system of basic prices for iron and steel products is only intended as an interim arrangement, applicable during the first quarter of 1978, pending the finalization of bilateral agreements
between the EEC and the countries concerned regulating quantities and proces of iron or steel imports.
'Art. 1, 3.
'On this question, see D. Ehle, Basic Aspects of the Antidumping Regulations of the Common
Market, 3 INT'L LAW. 494-497 (1969).
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1. The Definition of Dumping
The Regulation considers a product to have been dumped if the price of the
product when exported to the Community is less than the comparable price, in
the ordinary course of trade, of the like product'I on the home market. '

This comparison between the home market price and the export price of the
product concerned is normally to be made at the ex-factory level and with
respect to transactions made as nearly as possible at the same time.

2

If the product in question is not sold on the domestic market or where sales
on the domestic market, because of "the particular market situation," do not
allow a meaningful comparison to be made, the reference price, replacing the
domestic price, is either the price to a third country or a deemed price, based
on the cost of production in the home country increased by a reasonable
amount for overhead charges and for profits.' 3
One will have noted that the discretion of the Community authorities in

selecting either the third country price or the constructed value is considerable,
especially when compared to the situation in the United States.1
Likewise noteworthy is that under the Regulation the third country price
used in replacement of the home market price may be the highest third country
price, whereas in the United States, in case the export prices to third countries
vary, it is the preponderant price or a weighted average which is to be used as
reference.' 5 According to the EEC Regulation, it suffices that the selected
third country price be "representative."

Where no export price exists or where such price appears to be unreliable
because the exporter and importer are in one way or another related to each
other, the export price may be determined on the basis of the first resale to an

independent buyer, or if the goods are not resold in the same condition as im6
ported, on any reasonable basis.'
"The term like product is interpreted in Art. 5 to mean "a product which is identical, i.e., alike
in all respects .... or in the absence of such product, another product which has characteristics
closely resembling those of the product under consideration."
''Art. 3, 1 l(a).
"Art. 3, 4(a).
"Art. 3, 2, which, as to the addition for profits, provides that "it shall not exceed the profit
normally realized on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of the
country of origin." Compare to the U.S. Antidumping Act which provides for a specific minimum
amount of expenses (10%0 of cost of materials and processing) and of profit (8% of materials, pro-

cessing and expenses)

§ 206(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. 165(2).

"For instance, § 153.3 of the U.S. Customs Regulations only provides for a reference to the
third country price when the quantity of the product concerned which is sold on the home market
is too small to form an adequate basis for comparison. Also, in the United States the constructed
value test may only be followed if the other tests are insufficient or inadequate (§ 153.6), whereas
Art.'3,
2 of the Regulation does not hold such restriction (see also J. F. Beseler, Protection
against Dumping and Subsidies from Third Countries, 6 C.M.L. REV., p. 333 1969).
"Section 153.16 of the U.S. Customs Regulations.
"Art. 3, 3.
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Similarly, the Community enjoys substantial discretion with respect to imports from countries which have a state-controlled economy since in such a
situation special problems may arise in comparing prices."
In the event the product concerned is not exported into the Community
from the country of origin, but through an intermediate country, the price
comparison is not to be made with the domestic price in the country of origin
but with the domestic price in the exporting country. However, the comparison is nevertheless to be made with the domestic price in the country of
origin if the product simply passes in transit through the country of export or
if there is no comparable price for it in the country of export.' 8
Of course, when one compares the domestic with the export price for a given
product in order to determine the dumping margin, adjustments are to be
made for all factors affecting the price comparability. In this connection the
Regulation simply provides that due allowance is to be made "for the differences in conditions and terms of sale, for the differences in taxation and for
the other differences affecting price comparability,"" without spelling out in
detail, again unlike the U.S. Regulations,2" which factors may qualify as such
"other differences."
Thus, under the Regulation any such difference is to be taken into account
from the moment it "affects" the price comparability. In practice, however,
the rule is interpreted to require, as in the United States," that the circumstances
in question bear a "direct relationship" to the sales under consideration.22
Therefore, due allowance is usually made for differences between the domestic
and export price resulting from differences in transportation (including storage,
packaging, handling, insurance), financial cost (credit terms, guarantees, exchange rate), selling expenses, volume discounts, taxes and customs duties. To
the extent such expenses are higher in the country of origin than in the EEC, (or
are properly allocated only or mainly to domestic sales), the export price to the
EEC may legitimately be lower than the domestic price.
Research and development expenses are less likely to be taken into account
since, as a rule, they do not bear a direct relationship to any sales under consideration. As to certain selling expenses, it may often prove difficult to draw

"Art. 3, 1 6. Compare to § 153.7 of the U.S. Customs Regulations which sets more precise
guidelines, referring in such instances to the price (domestic or for export) for-or the constructed
value of-the product in a non-state-controlled-economy country. On the problem in general, see
R.A. Anthony, Antidumping Law and Policy, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159 (1969).
'"Art. 3, 1(b).
"Art. 3, 4(b).
"Sections 153.9 and 153.10 of the U.S. Customs Regulations.
"Section 153.10(a) of the U.S. Customs Regulations.
"W. MUELLER-THUNS & J.F. BESELER, DAs ANTIDUMPINGRECHT DER EWG, (Frankfurt, 1971)
p. 36.
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the line between expenses that have a direct impact on the sales under con-

sideration and expenses that affect such sales only indirectly. 23
As mentioned earlier in this paper, on the question of the relevant time
period, the Regulation requires the price comparison to be made in respect of

sales made as nearly as possible at the same time. This broad requirement
offers no ready solution to the numerous practical problems which may arise
when one endeavors to render the domestic price comparable to the export
price. For example, if, during a period of fluctuating exchange rates, the
impact of the exchange rate on the price comparability is to be measured,
several approaches could be followed. One could, for measuring the impact,
select the date and rate of the day the contract was formed, or the day on
which the goods were shipped, or the day on which the goods entered the

Common Market. The lack of precise guidelines in this respect again leaves
wide discretion to the Community authorities.
II. The Definition of Injury

For an antidumping duty to be applied, it is not sufficient that a given
product is being dumped. Its introduction into the Community must also cause
(or threaten to cause) a material injury to an existing Community industry or
must substantially delay the setting up of an industry whose early establishment in the Community is contemplated.

4

Rather than defining the term injury, the Regulation" specifies the circumstances which are relevant to an injury finding, to wit, developments and
prospects regarding-

" turnover, market share, profits,
2 6
" prices,
* employment,

" export performance,

"Whereas commissions and/or salaries of salesmen in the field and servicing costs are normally
taken into account, it is more difficult to determine whether part of the administrative overhead
may properly be allocated to the sales under consideration. It remains a question of fact regarding
which the Regulation leaves a wide discretion to the Community authorities. In the event an exporter claims, for instance, that the domestic price is to be reduced by certain advertising expenses,
he will have to show that there is a direct relationship between such expenses and domestic sales
and that export sales do not benefit from the advertising done in the country of origin. (See
MUELLER-THUNS & BESELER, Op. cit. p. 37).
"Art. 2.
2'Art. 4. 1 2.
11".6..
including the extent to which the delivered, duty-paid price is lower or higher than the
most representative comparable price of the like product prevailing in the ordinary course of trade
within the Community." (Art. 4, 2). This implies that the meeting of local competition on the export market is no defense against a dumping charge. See BESELER, Op. cit. p. 336. Incidentally, in
the United States the meeting of local competition defense has often led to no-injury decisions
(J.P. Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 929 (1964).
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* volume of dumped and other imports,
" productivity and utilization of capacity of the
Community industry in question and,
" restrictive trade practices.
None of these factors needs to be conclusive. In other words, the Regulation
requires that a comprehensive examination be made of all the circumstances
involved.
In addition the Regulation requires a casual relationship between dumping
and injury and provides that, if, as often is the case, the injury is the combined
result of the dumped imports and other factors as well, e.g., economic recession, the impact of the dumped imports must outweigh the impact of all other
factors taken together. The Regulation does, indeed, require that the dumped
imports are "demonstrably the principal cause" of the injury.27
The effect of the dumped imports is to be assessed in relation to the Community production of the like product or of the range of products which
include the like product. Normally, reference is to be made to the whole Commurity output or at least to a major portion of total Community production.
However, in exceptional circumstances, the Regulation accepts the regional
industry concept as a valid substitute for the Community industry concept.
This is notably the case if, due to transport costs, for example, all the producers of a given region sell all or virtually all their production within such a
region. However, in such a case also, injury may only be found if there is
injury to all or virtually all producers within the region or sub-market as
defined. 28
It is to be noted that unlike the situation in the United States,29 the establishment of dumping and injury by itself does not cause the imposition of an
antidumping duty; a third condition is to be fulfilled, to wit "the interests of
the Community should call for Community intervention." 30 In other words, it
is not sufficient that a particular industry is being injured but there is to be
examined the question whether or not the Community interests as a whole run
parallel with the industry concerned. For instance, the interests of the users or
consumers of the product at stake might make an intervention undesirable.
The discretion which the Community authorities enjoy in this respect is important because the automatic application of antidumping duties could, depending on the circumstances, lead to the undesirable result of protecting certain
competitors at the expense of competition.'
"Art. 4, l(a).
"Art. 4, 5(a).
"Antidumping Act, § 202(a), 19 U.S.C. 161.
"Art. 17, I.
"On this question in general see Note, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law?, 74
YALE L. J. 713 (1965).
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III. Rules of Procedure
1. Opening of Proceeding
Under normal circumstances a dumping proceeding is opened pursuant to a
complaint. It may be lodged by any natural or legal person, or any association
not having legal personalty, acting on behalf of the Community industry
which considers itself injured or threatened by dumping. 2
The complaint is to be filed in writing and should contain the following
information:
(a) a description of the allegedly dumped product;
(b) the name of the exporting country;
(c) where possible, the names of the country of origin, the producer and the
exporter of the product in question; and
(d) evidence both of dumping and of injury resulting therefrom to the industry which considers itself injured or threatened.33
The Commission has forms available for possible use by complainants. 3"
The complaint is to be filed either with the Commission (which must forward it to all Member States forthwith) or with any of the Member States in
which the Community industry in question is carried on. In the latter case the
Member State(s) in question must forward a copy of the complaint to the
Commission."
In the absence of any complaint a proceeding may be opened whenever a
Member State has sufficient evidence both of dumping and of injury resulting
therefrom to a Community industry. Such Member State is to immediately
communicate the evidence to the Commission which in turn is to forward it
36
forthwith to the other Member States.
It is to be noted that the right to initiate proceedings without a complaint is
only granted to the Member States, not to the Commission. Furthermore, it requires the existence of sufficient evidence both of dumping and of injury,
whereas in case a complaint is filed it suffices that the complainant submit
some evidence which need not yet be "sufficient."
2. Preliminary Examination by Member State(s)
The-division of authority in the Regulation between the Member States and
the Commission is the result of a compromise between the defenders of national sovereignty and those advocating Community powers which had to be
reached at the time the Regulation was enacted.
"Art. 6.
"Art. 7.
3"See Appendix I hereto.
"Art. 8, 2 and 3.
"Art. 8, 2 and 3.
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Basically, this compromise provides for a preliminary examination of the
complaint by. one or more Member States to see whether or not it contains the
information required and whether the margin of dumping, the volume of
dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury is negligible. 7
Only after a Member State has found the complaint to be in good order and
the matter not trivial, is the Commission in a position to commence the examination of the matter at Community level. 8 In other words, the Commission
always needs the green light from at least one Member State before it can start
investigating the matter.
If a Member State finds the complaint not to be in good order and/or the
matter to be trivial, it so advises the Commission which is in turn to inform all
other Member States. Such complaint will be rejected unless the Commission,
on its own behalf or on behalf of one of the other Member States, objects.39
The rejection of the complaint is made by the Member State to whom it was
sent or by the Commission, if filed with the Commission. Only in the latter instance could the complainant challenge the rejection before the Court of
Justice of the European Communities on the basis of Article 173 of the Treaty.
The rather rigid division of power between the national authorities and the
Commission, caused by purely political considerations since the matter .otherwise clearly falls within the scope of the Community's concern, appears to
have been worked out in practice through a spirit of cooperation rather than
antagonism."
The vehicle for this cooperation has been the so-called Advisory Committee,
composed of representatives of each Member State, with a representative of
the Commission as Chairman."
The 1973 amendment to the Regulation endorsed the informal nature of the
cooperation between the Commission and the Member States by allowing the
latter to inform the Commission orally of their views about the admissibility of
the complaint at the Advisory Committee. Thus, in practice the Commission
would seem to be involved from the outset, working together with the Member
States rather than intervening only at a second stage as planned by the drafters
of the Regulation.
3. Investigation by the Commission
Once the Commission is backed by at least one Member State, it formally

"Art.
"Art.
"Art.
"J.F.
p. 265.
"Art.

9.
10, 1.
9.
Beseler, Straffung des Europischen Antidumping- Verfahrensrechts, AWD, May 1974,
12.
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opens the antidumping proceeding by publishing a notice to that effect in the
Official Journal.
This notice indicates the product and country concerned and invites all interested parties to set forth their views in writing to the Commission within a
period of time and to apply for a hearing if they so wish.
A copy of the notice is sent to all exporters and importers concerned,
together with a standard questionnaire"' designed to give the Commission the
necessary information regarding the domestic and export prices concerned.
Usually the Commission's covering letter specifies the types of the product
concerned for which the answers to the questionnaire are to be prepared, and
for which period. In other words, the matters receiving prime emphasis in the
Commission's investigation are usually indicated in order to generate as
specific replies as possible.
All the parties directly concerned, i.e., the complainant, the exporters and
importers of the product in question and the official representatives of the exporting country are to be given access by the Commission to "all information
that is relevant to the defense of their interests and not confidential ....
3

and

that is used by the Commission in the antidumping investigation."
In actual practice the exporters and importers receive a copy of the complaint, nothing more. One may rightly wonder whether the Commission's file
at the outset of the proceeding does not already hold more information of interest to the parties concerned, notably the documents reflecting the cooperation between the Commission and the Member States in the initial investigation stage.
Prior to the 1973 amendment of the Regulation, the Commission was
authorized to obtain all necessary information from importers, exporters,
traders and producers, and from trade associations, but it had to send a copy
of the request to the Member State where the addressee -has his activities.
However, when the Commission wanted to double-check the information so
supplied, both in and outside the Community, it had to delegate the matter to
the Member States.
The 1973 amendment gives the Commission autonomous powers of investigation outside the Community provided it shall first "hear the opinion", of
the Advisory Committee."' Needless to say, the condition remains that the
undertakings concerned and the government of the country in question have to
be notified and have to give their consent.
Thus, in this field also, the Advisory Committee appears as the vehicle for
the necessary cooperation between the Commission and the Member States.
"See Appendix I hereto.
"Art. 10, 1 4.
"Art. 10, 1 3(b).
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The Committee meets any time this is deemed desirable by a Member State or
the Commission or whenever required under the Regulation. The consultations within the Committee are in closed session. The 1973 amendment allows
the Committee to be consulted in writing by the Commission; this is for the
sake of expediency when a meeting of the Committee might be less convenient.
As to the issue of confidentiality of documents submitted to the authorities
pursuant to the Regulation, the party making the disclosure is the first judge as
to whether the information released is confidential or not. If the authorities
find confidential treatment unwarranted, they may disregard the information
unless it can be double-checked otherwise."'
The problem of confidentiality may be particularly acute at the hearing. Indeed, at the hearing the opposing views of the parties in conflict confront each
other in a manner which resembles an adversary proceeding,"' the complainant(s) assuming in practice a function similar to that of plaintiff or public
prosecutor and the Commission acting as judge. During such confrontation
the exporters can hardly avoid discussing their prices and costs in the presence
of complainant(s). It is obvious that in this context and in the absence of any
guidelines in the Regulation, unlike the situation in the United States, 7 a party
may in the course of the hearing be pressured into disclosing information to
the other side out of fear that otherwise the Commission might disregard it.
One last point to be mentioned in connection with the investigation in
dumping cases is that the Regulation, in line with the GATT code, requires the
questions of dumping and injury to be considered simultaneously."
4. Possible Decisions
If the fact-finding of the Commission indicates that no dumping and/or
injury exists, it terminates the proceeding, provided no objection is raised
within the Advisory Committee. If objection is so raised, the Commission
refers the matter to the Council of Ministers. If the Council approves the Commission's proposal by a qualified majority, the proceeding shall stand terminated. The same is true in the absence of a reaction from the Council within
one month. The parties concerned are so informed and the termination is
49
normally published in the Official Journal.

"Art. 11, 13.
"Yet, the Regulation does not provide for a truly adversary type of proceeding, it remaining the
duty and responsibility of the Commission to determine the existence of dumping and injury. See
also the Commission's answer to Written Question No. 302/77, O.J. No. C 214, Sept. 7, 1977,
p. 14: "Once the case has been accepted for full investigation. . . . it is the duty of the Commission, not the industry, to prove that dumping is taking place."
"Section 153.23 of the U.S. Customs Regulations.
"Art. 10, 1.
"Art. 14, l(b).
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The proceeding is likewise terminated when the exporters agree to revise
their prices or to cease their exports, provided that the Commission, after
hearing from the Advisory Committee, finds it acceptable."0
The termination of a dumping proceeding because of a price revision undertaking is likewise published in the Official Journal but no details as to the contents of the undertaking are revealed.
In the author's experience, a price revision undertaking usually comprises:
" the establishment of a minimum price which is to serve as the base or
reference price" for the agreed-upon increases;
* the undertaking that, if the reference price is set CIF frontier EEC and the
product is imported by an affiliate, the resale price in the Community
shall not be lower than the reference price, increased by the applicable
customs duty, plus a given percentage representing freight and a given
percentage representing profit;
* the undertaking of the exporting firms(s) to increase5" the price(s) of the
product(s) concerned by given percentages" with reference to the base
price and on a step-by-step basis over a stated period of time;
" the undertaking of the exporters to use their best efforts to prevent evasion of the price revision by deliveries made indirectly from non-Member
States or by resales made by independent exporters;
" the undertaking of the exporters to use their best efforts to prevent evasion of the price revision by sales of a different origin than the sales subject to the dumping charge;
" the undertaking to submit regular" reports to the Commission, intended
to allow the Commission to keep a close watch on price developments;
" the starting date of the price revision" and the term" for which it is concluded.

"Art. 14, 1 2(a). However, in the rolling bearings case, instead of terminating the proceeding,
the Council merely suspended the actual collection of the antidumping duties in view of the exporters undertaking to revise their prices. This matter is at present on review before the Court of
Justice.
"insome cases the reference price was defined CIF frontier EEC whereas in other instances
reference was made to the first resale price within the EEC. The reference price is ordinarily defined in terms of the net weighted average price (taking into account year-end or other special
rebates) during a given period of time per type of the product concerned and expressed in a given
currency (the currency of the Member State in which delivery is made if the reference price is defined in terms of the first independent resale price).
."To the extent the stipulated increase is not in conflict with price control legislation applicable
in the importing countries involved.
"These percentages reflect the presumed dumping margin plus reference to a system which
keeps track of the rise in manufacturing costs in the country of origin.
"Usually on a quarterly basis.
"Usually the date of the conclusion of the settlement, but with the possibility of some specified
exceptions for contracts concluded at an earlier date but still awaiting performance.
"6Usually one year, renewable half-yearly by tacit agreement unless notice of termination is
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 3
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Since, according to the words of the Regulation, the voluntary undertaking
of the exporters is given "during examination of the matter,'"" it is obvious
that the undertaking is to be considered as a kind of "Consent Decree," not
implying any admission of guilt on the part of the exporters.
If the proceeding is not ended by way of settlement or by a finding of no
dumping and/or injury but instead dumping and injury are finally established
and the interests of the Community require an intervention, the Commission
shall, upon consultation of the Advisory Committee, submit a proposal to the
Council of Ministers for the levy of antidumping duties."
As to the form by which antidumping duties are imposed the Regulation
provides for a Council Regulation. 9 This implies a reasoned opinion and
publication in the Official Journal.
Such Regulation is to include a description of the product covered, including
a tariff description, commercial description, country of origin or export and
60
the name of the supplier.
If several suppliers are involved from the same country and it is impracticable to name them all, they need not be so named. Similarly, if several suppliers are involved from different countries, either all the suppliers are named
61
or all countries involved are specified.
The amount of an antidumping duty may not exceed the margin of dumping
established. Unlike the U.S. Antidumping Act, 62 it should even be less than
63
such margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remedy the injury.
Where a product is imported into the Community from more than one country, the duty is to be levied on a nondiscriminatory basis on all dumped im64
ports causing injury.
Antidumping duties may not be imposed nor increased with retroactive
effect. They shall only apply to all products entering for Community consumption (i.e., date of customs' declaration) after the coming into force of the
Regulation.
As to the geographic scope of application of the Regulation imposing duties,

given by one side to the other some time before the expiration of each period. The length of the applicable notice period is usually shortened (to as little as a few weeks) in the event the market situation of the product is substantially modified.
"Art. 14, 2(a). Compare this wording with the terms used in Art. 17, 11:
"Where the facts as
finally established show that there is dumping and injury.
(emphasis added).
"Art. 17, 1.
"Art. 19, 1 1.
6°Art. 20, 1.
"Art. 20, 2.
6"Section 202(a), 19 U.S.C. 161.
"Art. 19, 3.
"Art. 19, 2(c).
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it is to be the whole Community even when the relevant market did not comprise the whole Community.6"
An importer able to show that his imports were not dumped, or that the
margin of dumping is lower, has three months to file a claim for refund with
the Member State in whose territory the product entered. Such Member State
is to inform the Commission, which in turn is to inform the other Member
States. If within one month the Commission has not raised any objection, the
Member State in question will settle the issue independently."
The actual collection of the antidumping duties remains the task of the
Member States.6 '
The Commission, after consulting the Advisory Committee or, in cases of
extreme urgency, after informing the Member States, may fix an amount to be
secured by way of provisional antidumping duty, whenever the "preliminary
examination of the matter shows that there is dumping and there is sufficient
evidence of injury and the interests of the Community call for immediate
intervention ... "68
It is to be noted that the provisional duty is not collected but only secured6 9
and that such measure ordered by the Commission may not exceed a period of
three months unless extended by Council decision (for a period not exceeding
three months) upon request of the exporters and importers when the examination of the matter has not been completed. 0
Said secured duties are to be released unless the Council decides to collect all
or part of the moneys as an antidumping duty under the procedures explained
above.
Any Member State may request the Commission to impose provisional
antidumping duties. The Commission has only five days to decide the question. A negative decision of the Commission may be overruled by the
Council."
Thus far the Commission has twice imposed provisional antidumping
duties. It did so in two of the proceedings which resulted in the imposition of
definitive antidumping duties. 2

"However, in such instance the exporters are to be given a chance to undertake to cease dumping in the region concerned before any antidumping duties are applied on a Community-wide
basis. Art. 19, 5.
6'Art. 19, 1 4(b).
6'Art. 21.
"Art. 15, 1 l(a).
"In practice by way of a bond acceptable to the customs authorities.
2.
."Art. 16,
1(c).
"Art. 15,
"Bicycle chains (Taiwan): Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2757/76 of November 12, 1976,
O.J. No. L 312 of November 13, 1976, p. 41; completed by Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
2888/76 of November 29, 1976, O.J. No. L 331 of November 30, 1976, p. 26. Rolling Bearings
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IV. Current Practice
1. Settlement
From an analysis of the Table of Cases attached hereto73 one learns that unii now in a majority of cases proceedings have been terminated as a result of a
voluntary undertaking to raise prices subscribed to by the exporters. As a
matter of fact, of the twenty-seven cases, or so considered, fourteen were
closed because of a price revision, ten were closed because of changes in the
market situation, one7 ' was closed because the requirements for antidumping
measures were not met, and two cases were closed by the imposition of
antidumping duties: bicycle chains (Taiwan), rolling bearings (Japan) and steel
nuts (Taiwan), (see supra note 1).
The Commission's apparent policy favoring enforcement of the Regulation
by the conclusion of voluntary undertakings may be explained by the fact that
the Commission thereby avoids having to go to the Council of Ministers for
approval of its action, and by the fact that, prior to the 1973 amendment to the
Regulation, the Commission's powers of investigation depended on the
cooperation of Member States. These two factors, together with a lack of
staff 5 may well be the reason for the Commission's preferences to dispose of
dumping proceedings by way of settlement, instead of engaging in painstaking
fact-finding leading to the imposition of an antidumping duty, which would
require the consent of the Council of Ministers and would be subject to
judicial review.
The advantage of such a policy for the Commission and the parties would
seem to be the speed with which the problems are resolved and results are
obtained. In addition, it provides a "graceful way out" for all three parties
involved: the complainants, the exporters and the Commission.
An obvious drawback to the price revision practice is that, except for those
participating in the settlement negotiations, it is hard to know how the Regulation is administered in practice. The price revision practice prevents case law
from developing. It would be helpful for everybody concerned if the wide
discretion left to the Commission under the Regulation rendered more precise
through interpretations and guidelines issued by the Court of Justice of the
Communities in reviewing a number of particular situations.

(Japan), Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 261/77 of February 4, 1977, O.J. No. L 34 of
February 5, 1977 pp. 60-61.
"Appendix L
"Ammonium nitrate fertilizers (Yugoslavia).
"At the Commission only some five professionals presently deal with antidumping investigations.
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The Commission's emphasis on the conclusion of settlements rather than on
the findings of dumping and injury may also be the reason why some of the
procedural safeguards built into the Regulation have thus far not received the
attention and emphasis they deserve.
This fact is highlighted, for instance, by the way in which the hearings are
organized, particularly in that the Commission is known for not providing for
a taped or stenographic record of what transpires at the hearing. This implies
that the Commission is in a position to make use of data discussed at the hearing as it sees fit, whereas the other parties are unable to avail themselves of the
discussions at the hearing,6 later in court for example, because they are not
7
reproduced in any form.
It is understandable that the absence of a record may stimulate the free flow
of information during the hearing, which in turn may make it easier for the
Commission to reach a compromise and obtain a price revision. However, this
possible benefit is clearly at the expense of due process and therefore hardly
acceptable. This is especially apparent if the proceeding is subsequently not
terminated by way of a voluntary undertaking given by the exporters but by
way of a Council Regulation imposing antidumping duties.
2. Decision
A reading of the first two decisions imposing antidumping duties is disappointing if one had hoped to learn how such duties are actually arrived at by
the Community authorities. In both the bicycle chain and rolling bearing
cases, the Council explains its findings of dumping and injury in rather cryptic
language, not even allowing the parties concerned, let alone complete outsiders, to grasp how the Regulation has been applied to the case.
Symptomatic of this state of affairs, for instance, is the fact that the
"whereas clauses" used to explain the finding of injury in the Council Regulation on rolling bearings from Japan are virtually identical to the finding of injury in the Commission's earlier Regulation imposing a provisional antidumping duty on bicycle chains originating in Taiwan. This goes to show that the
language used to describe the finding of injury in one case has been so broad
and general that it could be used without "major surgery" to fit a different
case. Yet, the products and countries concerned were quite different.
The obvious danger of basing the essential finding of injury on rather
abstract generalizations is that the protection offered by the Regulation is in
effect being preempted of any real meaning. Indeed, what good does it do for

'The author of this paper has had the experience of the Chairman of the hearing expressly forbidding the parties to make a record by tape, or otherwise, of the hearing.
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the exporters to know, for instance, that both in the bicycle chain and rolling
bearing cases the Regulations state that "the dumped imports are demonstrably the principal cause of such injury" if such statement appears to be no
more than ipse dixit? No mention is made, for example, of the undeniable impact of the economic recession and the rationalization measures of local producers on the unemployment and reduction in profits mentioned to support
the injury finding.
The same criticism, i.e., the lack of precision, 7 appears to be warranted
with respect to the dumping findings in the two Council Regulations discussed.
Neither of the two Regulations offer any specific pricing data on which the
finding is based or give any indication of the method of calculation of the
allowances made for the differences affecting the comparability of the
domestic and export prices. Thus, notwithstanding the publication in the Official Journal of the Council's decision in their case, the parties remain in the
dark as to how the figures they submitted have been used or interpreted to arrive at the finding of dumping.
This "inquisitorial" aspect of antidumping proceedings is particularly
serious in view of the fact that in any antidumping proceedings the method of
calculation and the interpretation of the figures and data supplied are at least
as important as the figures and data themselves.
In light of the first two cases decided by the EEC Council, the point is to be
stressed that a meaningful application of the Antidumping Regulation requires
more than lip service to its main provisions. Above all it requires that the facts
on which the essential findings are based are to be set out in some detail. It
would seem that both the parties concerned and the public in general are entitled to know how the Regulation is administered in practice.
The lack of disclosure in the proceedings before the EEC Commission and
Council is also quite unfortunate if one realizes that when the matter is on appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, this Court will
have to perform the difficult dual function of establishing the facts of the matter and finally deciding the case. A more open proceeding before the Commission would alleviate the burden of the Court and would give the applicant in
Court the benefit of a true appellate review."

"Also unclear in the Council Regulation imposing an antidumping duty on rolling bearings is
the fact that the finding of dumping ecompasses all bearings originating in Japan, irrespective of
the producers concerned, whereas regarding the collection of the provisional duties the Regulation
only provides for definitive collection from four named producers. No explanation is given for this
apparent discrepancy.
"The question whether or not an appeal is at all possible against a council regulation imposing a
dumping duty is apparently one of the issues presently before the European Court of Jusitce in the
Rolling Bearings (Japan) case. The author understands the Commission to argue that according to
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Until now, the Commission's policy of accepting voluntary undertakings
from exporters has enabled it to dispose of most cases. However, the present
economic recession and the rising tide of protectionism will in all likelihood
make it more and more difficult for the Commission to terminate proceedings
by the way of settlement. This implies that, from the outset of an antidumping
proceeding, the parties concerned have to reckon with the possibility that the
proceding may well end by the imposition of antidumping duties rather than
by the conclusion of a settlement (or because of changes in the market situation), as used to be the case until recently.79
In this perspective, it becomes all the more important that the procedural
safeguards in the Regulation are complied with and that the Court of Justice
sets the standards of fairness in the areas where the Regulation leaves wide
discretion to the Community authorities. Only by the development of a body
of case law may one expect the Regulation to protect the principle of freedom
of commerce in times of crisis when political and economic pressures tend to
override the rule of law.

article 173 para. 2 of the EEC Treaty, regulations may only be appealed by private persons, when
they are of direct and individual concern to them. The Commission apparently claims that this
condition is not fulfilled in the Rolling Bearings case pending before the court.
"Needless to say, the preparation of a file for use by the exporters at settlement negotiations
with the EEC Commission may be different from the file a legal practitioner would advise his
client to prepare for eventual use in the Court of Justice, should the settlement negotiations fail
and antidumping duties be imposed.
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